India plays a dangerous double game in Asian geopolitics. Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives in Tianjin on Saturday, August 30th, for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s (SCO) summit, projecting renewed ties with Beijing. Yet his government simultaneously deepens military cooperation with Japan in arrangements explicitly designed to contain China in the “Indo-Pacific”. This India-Japan defence pact reveals the contradictions underlying Mr Modi’s foreign policy regarding China.
The India-Japan joint security declaration, published before Mr Modi’s China visit, adopts familiar “Indo-Pacific” rhetoric that masks anti-China intentions.
Both countries pledge to maintain a “free, open, peaceful, prosperous, and coercion-free Indo-Pacific region” while opposing “destabilising or unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force”.
These coded phrases target China’s assertiveness in disputed waters. The timing proves particularly provocative as Mr Modi simultaneously courts the Chinese leadership.
Mr Modi’s visit to the SCO Summit 2025 underlines that New Delhi is using the crucial 20-member body’s highest meet to bargain with the US, which has recently imposed 50% tariffs—25% base and 25% punitive for buying Russian oil—on imports from India.
Contrary to the speculations made by the West’s mainstream media and the press in countries like China and Russia, India has not been distancing itself from the US-led financial-military bloc; rather, it’s using the optics of growing India-China proximity to pressurise Washington to retreat from its approach.
Mr Modi’s foreign policy regarding China won’t change drastically, and New Delhi will continue to ally against China, which the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan has emphasised.
Military integration targets Chinese capabilities
The defence cooperation encompasses extensive military coordination that would alarm Beijing.
India and Japan commit to “bilateral exercises between forces in a wide range of fields with increasing complexity and sophistication”.
These war games will include tri-service humanitarian operations, special forces collaboration, and shared logistics support.
Such arrangements create interoperable forces capable of coordinated action against common threats.
Intelligence sharing receives special emphasis through “assessments with respect to emerging security risks”.
This information exchange will focus heavily on Chinese military developments.
Both countries pledge enhanced “situational awareness” through maritime domain surveillance systems.
The Information Fusion Centre in India and Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness represent intelligence networks monitoring Chinese naval activities.
Technology cooperation extends beyond traditional defence equipment. Both sides commit to collaboration in “AI, robotics, quantum, semiconductor, autonomous technology, future networks, biotechnology and cyber security”.
This technological partnership aims to reduce dependence on Chinese supply chains while developing capabilities to counter Chinese advances.
Critical minerals cooperation addresses Chinese dominance in rare earth resources essential for military systems.
The space dimension adds another layer of strategic competition.
India and Japan will expand “use of respective space systems for national security, satellite-based navigation, earth observation” while conducting “Space Situational Awareness including tracking, monitoring, and management of space debris”.
These capabilities directly challenge China’s growing space power.
The carefully worded statement has evaded mentioning China directly; however, it has indicated the Asian giant in all its activities.
Exhibiting that Mr Modi’s foreign policy continues to treat China as an adversary, the Indo-Japan joint declaration came at a crucial time, when both New Delhi and Tokyo can’t hide their inconveniences.
China celebrates Japan’s surrender, Tokyo lobbies against
China is preparing a major military parade on September 3rd to commemorate its victory in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in 1945.
The Japanese fascist forces had surrendered to the united Chinese forces, led by the Communist Party of China (CPC), the nationalist Kuomintang, and the Allied Forces.
This gala event is used by the CPC to instigate national pride among the Chinese people and follows similar celebrations in Moscow, earlier in May, where the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory against Nazi Germany was celebrated this year.
Now, as China gears up to celebrate the event, where Russian President Vladimir Putin will participate, Tokyo has been lobbying with several countries from the allies bloc, insisting that they boycott the programme.
Japanese media alleges that Tokyo blames Beijing for using “anti-Japanese overtones” in its campaign for the mega event.
This messaging is quite imperative for Mr Modi, as it aligns with his foreign policy approach regarding China.
Mr Modi’s government will not take part in the event, which was closely linked to India’s national movement for freedom.
One of the major reasons is that Mr Modi’s far-right Hindutva camp had supported the Axis Powers until the start of the Second World War.
It ideologically hails the fascist militarist state and draws its idea of nationalism from the Italian and Japanese fascists.
Amid this, Mr Modi’s hobnobbing with Japan, whose recent attempts to militarise itself, with American support, is seen as a threat to global peace by experts in China and abroad, drives a message to Beijing.
It indicates that, despite being a crucial member of the SCO, which has its own security framework, India will rely mostly on the US-led military blocs that aim to contain China in the region.
Economic security rhetoric masks containment strategy
The Indo-Japanese declaration employs economic security language to justify technological decoupling from China. Both countries pledge to address “economic coercion, non-market policies and practices and excess capacity resulting from them”.
This phraseology directly references Chinese industrial policies that Western nations consider unfair trade practices.
Supply chain resilience initiatives aim to reduce Chinese dependencies in critical sectors.
The agreement calls for “mitigating vulnerabilities in strategic areas” through alternative procurement networks.
However, there is no mention of such alternative procurement sources.
Although it indicates that India and Japan will buy from whoever is authorised by the US, they didn’t name any source because there is none at the moment.
Defence industrial cooperation includes “export control policies and practices to encourage and promote cooperation in high-end technology and equipment”.
These arrangements exclude Chinese participation in sensitive technology transfers.
Although China surpasses both India and Japan in technology and innovation, the idea of excluding it appears infantile in the present geopolitical scenario.
The focus on “quality infrastructure investment, which respects national sovereignty and territorial integrity” represents a direct challenge to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
While both India and Japan, under American pressure, desisted from joining the BRI, India has partnered with the US, Israel, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the UAE to build a shipping-railway infrastructure project.
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) project is an ambitious one adopted during the G20 Summit in New Delhi in 2023; however, its future remains uncertain due to Israel’s attacks on Gaza.
While India is a key partner of the US in the IMEC, which is seen as an alternative to the BRI, Japan has promised to fund it. Yet, the project moved nowhere in over two years, despite Israel’s insistence.
In the declaration, both countries present their infrastructure partnerships as alternatives to Chinese development finance.
This competition extends throughout the Indo-Pacific region, where Chinese infrastructure projects have expanded rapidly.
Quad coordination strengthens anti-China alliance
The declaration explicitly commits to “deepening cooperation within the Quad and advancing the Quad’s positive and practical agenda”.
This four-nation grouping, including Australia and the US, represents the primary multilateral mechanism for coordinating China containment policies.
India’s participation contradicts its traditional non-alignment principles while complicating relations with Beijing.
ASEAN engagement receives attention through support for “ASEAN centrality and unity, ASEAN-led frameworks, and ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”.
Both countries seek to prevent ASEAN from tilting toward Chinese influence through alternative partnership offers. This competition for regional alignment intensifies strategic rivalries throughout Southeast Asia.
United Nations Security Council reform provides another avenue for coordination.
Both countries support each other’s candidature for permanent membership in an expanded council.
This mutual backing aims to dilute Chinese influence within UN structures while strengthening their own positions.
Modi’s foreign policy duplicity on China exposed
The India-Japan defence pact reveals fundamental contradictions in Mr Modi’s foreign policy approach regarding China.
His attendance at the SCO summit suggests interest in maintaining stable China relations despite border tensions.
Yet this military cooperation with Japan clearly prepares for potential conflict scenarios involving Chinese forces.
This strategic ambiguity may reflect domestic political calculations.
Mr Modi benefits from appearing tough on China through military partnerships while avoiding economic decoupling costs.
India’s growing defence relationship with Japan signals resolve without triggering immediate Chinese retaliation.
However, such duplicitous approaches risk long-term strategic credibility.
Beijing recognises these military arrangements as hostile acts regardless of diplomatic pleasantries at SCO gatherings.
China’s own strategic planning accounts for deepening India-Japan cooperation that threatens its regional position.
The declaration’s scope suggests both countries view confrontation with China as increasingly likely.
Their extensive preparations across military, technological, and intelligence domains indicate serious strategic competition rather than routine diplomatic cooperation.
Mr Modi’s simultaneous engagement with Beijing appears increasingly hollow given these military realities.
This contradiction reflects broader challenges facing middle powers caught between Chinese growth and American alliance systems.
India seeks benefits from both relationships while preparing for potential conflicts with either partner. This is how Mr Modi has shaped his foreign policy of convenience regarding the US, China and other powers.
Such strategic hedging becomes more difficult as great power competition intensifies throughout the Indo-Pacific region.
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